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The Power of Networks
in International Politics

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Networks are ubiquitous in social life. But this book highlights political networks, in the sense that they have either political causes or political effects or both. Likewise, the authors focus on transnational political networks where network membership or network effects, or both, stretch across national borders. The strength of this book is that it brings together a discussion of a wide variety of transnational political networks that have previously been considered separately. In doing so, it allows us to ask and answer theoretical and empirical questions about the general role of networks in global politics.

In chapter 1, Kahler presents the main conceptual and definitional issues, and discusses the broad relevance of network research to key debates in international relations. The conclusions focus on summarizing the answers that the chapters provide to a more focused set of research questions about networks. Many of these answers are related to how power is exercised by and in networks, which is the main theme of this final chapter. Specifically, I will address: (1) how and why networks emerge, scale-up, and proliferate; (2) under which conditions networks can have influence or be effective; and (3) how networks contribute to global governance, and how to address questions of accountability. The answers to these questions often vary, however, with the different types of networks discussed in the book, so a brief discussion of types of networks precedes the exploration of these research questions.

Types of Networks

The authors in this book use two main approaches to networks: network-as-structure and network-as-agent (or unintentional and intentional networks).

Despite these labels, structure is a constant for all networks. But networks-as-actors are thick intentional networks that are simultaneously both structures and agents, while networks-as-structures are thinner, uncoordinated networks that only exist as structures. These two approaches may actually signal two end points on a continuum with fully intentional networks on one side and purely unintentional networks on the other; many of the actual networks we study may combine conscious and unintentional elements and fall at some midpoint on the continuum. The distinction is nevertheless important for many of the answers to the questions discussed here.

An additional way to categorize networks-as-actors is to focus on the main type of actors involved, their main purposes, and their main tactics. Networks-as-actors are purposeful, often strategic actors, while networks as structures are not purposive actors, and thus cannot be characterized either by the main purposes of their enterprise or by their tactics. Within the category of networks-as-actors, the purpose of the network and the types of actors involved may influence in very important ways its tactics and dynamics. For example, the differences are quite stark between Kenney's drug networks (chapter 5), where the purpose is the promise of fantastic profits and the political power necessary to facilitate that personal enrichment, and Yanacopulos's justice network (chapter 4), where the purpose is to reduce debt payments for impoverished countries.

Many different types of actors use network forms of organization; while networks are the organizational vehicle of choice of small nonstate actors, they are also used by states and business groups. Networks often bring together diverse types of actors, but most networks are dominated or characterized by a particular type of actor. Transgovernmental networks are made up exclusively of state actors, drug networks are dominated by illicit business groups, while nongovernmental organizations and social movements play a central role in transnational advocacy networks. Epistemic communities are networks where scientists and experts, both inside and outside of governments, are key players, and armed insurgents dominate terrorist networks. But in addition to thinking about the dominant types of actors involved in networks, it may also be useful to think about the main actors behind the formation of networks. The networks discussed by Stein (chapter 8), Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (chapter 10), and Cowhey and Mueller (chapter 9) are all *government organized networks*, even though in the case of humanitarian networks and Internet networks, many of their members are nongovernmental. Human rights networks and debt-relief networks, on the other hand, are networks mainly *of* nongovernmental actors organized *by* nongovernmental organizations.

Networks are motivated by different purposes. Every network has multiple motivations, including its own survival, but we can still identify the main purpose of most networks. Some networks form mainly to pursue economic gain (like drug networks) while others pursue policy coordination and implementation (such as the TGNs discussed by Eilstrup-Sangiovanni). Advocacy

networks form to promote principled ideas, while many humanitarian networks devote most of their energies to the delivery of humanitarian services. All use network forms of organization, but the main purpose shapes the particular form the networks take and the tactics they use. Network purpose is intimately related to the issues of power discussed here, because it clarifies the question of the purposes for which network power is exercised. Network power is usually not an end in itself but a tool to achieve purposes, and thus the consideration of network purpose must go hand in hand with an exploration of network power.

Another important distinction between different networks is the distinction between those networks that engage in clandestine or illicit activity and thus often use violent tactics, such as the drug and terrorist networks, and those networks that engage in public or legal activity and use nonviolent tactics. For the public/legal networks, especially advocacy networks, the search for publicity is the driving force behind their formation and functioning. For the clandestine networks, as Kenney says, "secrecy is the driving force behind organizational structure." If, as network theorists argue, network structure helps explain the functioning and outcomes of networks, and if secrecy is the driving force behind network structure in clandestine networks, we expect that clandestine networks will be quite different than public ones. In secret networks communication within and across cells is fairly limited. Most other networks don't limit information, but take advantage of one of the main characteristics of networks—their ability to move large amounts of information quickly and easily.

Despite these differences in types of networks, almost all of the chapters in this book stress some common characteristics of networks: (1) their voluntary nature and thus the possibility of exit; (2) the central role of information and learning; (3) their ability to build trust and confidence among network participants, and (4) their flexibility and adaptability compared to other organizational forms.

Many chapters stress the voluntary nature of the networks they study. For networks-as-actors, network nodes choose whether to participate in networks. This gives networks their informal nature and means that you can't "lock-in" either actors or commitments. Thus networks must create benefits for network members, what many authors refer to as network externalities, in order for networks to continue to exist. These benefits may be of a very diverse sort—but because networks are voluntary, nodes will exit if they do not perceive benefits, and seek out other kinds of arrangements.

All the chapters also stress the informational role of networks. One of the most striking characteristics of networks is that they are "particularly apt for circumstances in which there is a need for efficient reliable information" (Powell 1990). Because networks are based on trust and reciprocity they encourage people to exchange information, not just purchase it. Networks provide access to tacit knowledge that is difficult to codify and resides in the heads

of experienced practitioners (Kenney, chapter 5). Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (chapter 10) stresses that the lack of hierarchical organization in the transgovernmental networks she studies contributes to the speed and efficiency of communication, as well as more opportunities for local initiative. The centrality of the transfer of reliable information is a characteristic of both the networks-as-actors and the networks-as-structures examined in this book. Learning- and information-based adaptation are primary characteristics of Elkin's constitutional network (chapter 3). Stein also argues that the ALNAP has been a source for learning internally and in the larger networks of the humanitarian sector (chapter 8).

A third shared characteristic of the networks-as-actors examined in this book is the ability to build trust and confidence among participants to facilitate coordination and collective action. So, for example, Eilstrup-Sangiovanni considers trust-based relations as one of the four characteristics of networks that are important for political coordination. She argues that networks are "more dependent on trust than other organizational forms." The role of trust in networks also derives from the fact that many political networks are embedded in broader social networks. In most political networks, these broader social networks are useful for both recruiting people of confidence and for linking networks to the outside political actors that they hope to influence. These social networks seem to be even more important in the case of illicit networks (at least they are mentioned more explicitly in the chapters by Kenney and Kahler).

Finally, all networks appear to have greater flexibility and adaptability than other organizational forms. They can both expand freely, and they can decouple more easily. Slaughter (2004a), discussing TGNs, stresses that because networks are more flexible and have low sovereignty costs, they are often the vehicles of choice for international cooperation. Networks can "adjust quickly to new problems or unanticipated changes in their environment" (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, chapter 10). The downside of this flexibility, however, is that this increases bargaining costs and creates more potential for conflict. Kenney (chapter 5) also stresses organizational flexibility as one of the attributes that favors networks over hierarchies.

But despite these similarities and commonalities among different kinds of networks, the differences among networks are so striking that we need to be careful not to overemphasize the similarities and ignore the differences, especially the differences between networks-as-structures and networks-as-actors.

How and Why Have Networks Emerged and Grown?

The authors take up many issues about the life cycle of networks, especially questions of why and how networks are born or emerge, how they grow or

"scale-up" and why some networks disappear or die. Here we will focus in particular on the issue of network emergence and growth.

The chapters focusing on networks-as-structures and networks-as-actors differ in their approach to the issue of network emergence. Those who put more emphasis on agency stress how "networks are built" while those who focus on the networks-as-structures stress how "networks happen." These two approaches are not always mutually intelligible. Hafner-Burton and Montgomery (chapter 2) conclude that a network automatically forms when states join a type of international treaty organization called a preferential trade agreement (PTA). But such a definition makes Eilstrup-Sangiovanni's main question superfluous. She asks why states form networks *instead of* forming international treaty organizations. We can only make sense of these differences when we understand the differences between these two understandings of networks. States choose whether to form a TGN (a network-as-agent) or an international treaty organization (ITO). Inadvertently, upon joining an ITO, they may also form a network-as-structure, even if they are not aware of it.

Thus, for Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, the decisions of many states to join a preferential trade agreement in turn *create* a network. But to say that the PTA creates the network suggests that there is some agency to create a network. It would be more appropriate to say that when many states join a PTA, a network happens or emerges.

Existing literatures pose various hypotheses to explain the growth in transnational networks. There are different "origin stories" for networks. One prominent explanation for network emergence is a delegation account. Networks exist because other actors, mainly states but also international organizations, have created them and delegated authority to them (Cowhey and Mueller, chapter 9). These networks can be seen as examples of delegation from executives to lower-level officials (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, chapter 10), or from states to nonstate actors like the Internet Engineering Task Force acting on behalf of states to carry out policy coordination and standard setting (Cowhey and Mueller, chapter 9), or delegation by states to nongovernmental organizations to deliver services (Stein, chapter 8). This delegation model is clearly more useful in explaining the emergence of government-organized networks than the emergence of networks organized by nongovernmental organizations.

Another key explanation for network emergence is simply that growing functional interdependence has led to the growth of all forms of international association, of which networks are simply one example. Yet another explanation is that technological change and increasing complexity have contributed to the kinds of connections essential to the formation and sustaining of networks (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, chapter 10). These hypotheses are relevant to the formation of all the networks considered here, both networks-as-structures and networks-as-actors.

Most of these explanations are macrolevel phenomena that may help ex-

plain the overall increase in transnational networks, but are less useful for explaining why networks emerge around some issues, but not others, or with some members and not others. Also, most of these explanations have been used to explain the rise of international institutions more generally; thus, they can't always explain why actors prefer networked forms of organization as compared to other forms (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, chapter 10).

The authors propose additional hypotheses that focus on explaining why networks emerge instead of some other organizational form. Both state and nonstate actors may choose network forms of organization because they allow actors to preserve autonomy. Actors surrender less autonomy in network forms of organization because no formal commitments are made, and the exit option continues to be open to network participants. Stein lists the desire for autonomy as part of the reason networks emerge in the area of humanitarian assistance. But it is exactly this characteristic of networks that may make them less desirable in other situations, as Eilstrup-Sangiovanni reminds us. When actors prefer to lock-in commitments and lower the risk of defection, they will be less likely to choose networks.

Both Kenney and Eilstrup-Sangiovanni suggest that the rise of one form of network generates the need for the rise of "networked responses." The rise of transnational networks of nonstate actors (especially illicit or violent ones) may generate networked responses on the part of governments. Various chapter authors ask explicitly why and when networks emerge instead of some type of hierarchy. Their answers focus on the specific benefits actors receive through networked cooperation. Both Kahler and Stein, for example, link the issue of network growth to the effectiveness of networks. Kahler (chapter 6) says that networks are more likely to emerge when they are likely to be more successful than hierarchies at promoting collective action. In the case of humanitarian organizations, Stein argues that it was their success in delivering goods and services that led to increased demands for such organizations. Second, she argues, the withdrawal of states from this area of direct service delivery at the same time as states increased their funding for humanitarian assistance has led to increased demand for humanitarian networks.

Eilstrup-Sangiovanni proposes a persuasive argument about why governments choose to form TGNs instead of international treaty organizations. Governments are more likely to choose networked forms of organization when (1) issues call for quick action; (2) uncertainty is pronounced; (3) their preferences differ from rival domestic agents; and (4) there is a desire to avoid spoilers.

One question is how well this argument travels to help explain the formation of other forms of networks. The first two points above relate to the nature of the issue area. There is some evidence from the chapters that the nature of the issue area does influence whether or not actors choose networks. Terrorist groups and drug networks may choose networks because they can act quickly and are easier to keep secret and under the radar screen. But

advocacy groups may choose networks because they are efficient tools for getting public information out to a wider audience. Although these may seem contradictory, they are both consistent with aspects of what we know about the characteristics of networks.

In other ways, Eilstrup-Sangiovanni's argument doesn't travel. She makes an argument about the opportunity costs of different organizational forms for different actors. An opportunity-cost argument depends on the organizational alternatives or menus that actors have available to them. Since only states can be full members of international treaty organizations, only states choose between networks and ITOs. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni's argument will be most useful to understand government-organized networks such as TGNs, or those described in the chapters by Stein and Cowhey and Mueller.

Nongovernmental actors are not able to choose between creating either a network or an international treaty organization. Transnational advocacy organizations often participate in international treaty organizations, but they cannot create them. The human rights networks described by Lake and Wong (chapter 7) see their networks as complements to, not as alternatives to, human rights treaty organizations. For many nonstate actors, the *alternatives* they have open to them are either to build their own hierarchical international nongovernmental organization or to pursue networked forms of organization. Our dark networks also have this choice open to them, but the costs of a hierarchical organization may be even greater for drug or terrorist networks than for advocacy networks or epistemic communities. When the costs of building hierarchical nongovernmental organizations are large for nonstate actors, the choice of networked forms of organization may be more obvious for them than it is for states.

For networks-as-structures, and particularly as examples of uncoordinated interdependence, it is not appropriate to say that actors choose to form a network. Governments may choose to adopt practices similar to those adopted in other countries (constitutional provisions, for example, in the case of Elkins, chapter 3), but they don't choose to form or join a network-as-structure. The network emerges as a result of their uncoordinated policy choices. Networks happen when countries do the same thing (not necessarily by being in contact with one another). In order to explain why networks-as-structures emerge and grow, we need to explain why countries do the same thing. This is the central question for both the sociological institutionalist literature and the diffusion literature. Synthesizing some of these literatures, Elkins proposes that the networks he is writing about emerge and grow through processes of adaptation and learning, especially through cultural norms, support groups, competition, information cascades, learning from available models, and learning from reference groups.

Under What Conditions Can Networks Have Influence? Network Effects and Network Effectiveness

Defining Effectiveness

Networks-as-structures are unintentional and uncoordinated, and thus do not act collectively. In the networks-as-structure approach, authors stress networks' effects rather than effectiveness, and clarify that such effects can be suboptimal or functional and efficient (Elkins, chapter 3). In this sense, we could say that some networks have "influence" but are not necessarily "effective" in the sense of meeting specific goals.

Networks-as-actors, on the other hand, are often consciously designed to act collectively to further specific goals. In this approach, the notion of effectiveness involves change or collective action in the direction of network goals. If the network produces changes contrary to its goals, we would say the network failed. This book, however, explodes the notion that network effectiveness might always involve some public good. For terrorist networks or drug networks, effectiveness implies the ability to reach their goals, which would include the ability to create terror or to expand the production and distribution of drugs.

This raises issues about what we mean by effectiveness. The authors in the book are concerned with effectiveness at three different levels: (1) agenda setting and information provision; (2) policy and discursive change; and (3) behavioral change by key actors.

Some chapters focus mainly on the effectiveness of networks in setting agendas within networks and outside of the networks in the policy sphere. This is the main focus of the chapter by Lake and Wong (chapter 7), which stresses that Amnesty International helped set the agenda for the whole human rights network to work on a small set of civil and political rights. Kahler is also concerned with agenda setting within networks and outside of networks, and argues that one of the main successes of al Qaeda was its ability to shift its focus to the far enemy, the United States.

Stein points out that humanitarian service organizations have multiple understandings of effectiveness, but all the definitions are ultimately concerned with behavioral change in the field of both the givers and the recipients of aid. In the case of humanitarian organizations, and perhaps other service delivery organizations, effectiveness involves the delivery of services, not simply the setting of agendas or discursive change of key actors.

Documenting Effectiveness

It is difficult to research and document network effectiveness. Arguments about effectiveness are often counterfactual, in that they argue that networks are effective compared to what existed before networks, or what would have

existed without networks (this is the essence of Yanacopulos's arguments on the campaign for debt relief, chapter 4). Second, some argue that networks are effective compared to other forms of organization, especially hierarchies, including states and formal international organizations. Some authors discuss effectiveness in relation to ideals. The critique of humanitarian organizations is often a critique of their effectiveness (or accountability) compared to an ideal of what they should do. These ideals may be those of the organizations themselves, in their mission statement, or those of the publics they serve, or of the donors.

The chapter by Yanacopulos is focused primarily on the issue of effectiveness. For her, the networks were effective at different levels. She is first concerned with the "ability to raise awareness about the issue," and get the debt cancellation issue onto the agendas of the G8, the international financial institutions, and the media. Indeed, the campaign was apparently so effective in influencing the discursive positions of the British government under Tony Blair that it made network members uncomfortable that there were too many similarities between their demands and the government's positions, at least on paper. But Yanacopulos is also concerned with behavioral change on the part of key target actors—for example, whether the Jubilee 2000 campaign actually led to debt reduction or cancellation. She argues that there was more progress on reducing debt and increasing development aid than there would have been in the absence of the network campaigns. Kahler (chapter 6) is also interested in behavioral change, and gauging whether terrorist networks produce "successful" collective actions; in his particular case, an increase in global terrorist activity by network partners.

Eilstrup-Sangiovanni considers TGNs to have been effective in some cases. She argues that the TGNs she studies contributed to a reduction in missile proliferation and made possible some interdictions of materials for nuclear proliferation. But she also points to the limitations of these networks. Their major strength appears to be in setting standards that nonmembers can later be pressured to adopt. But the one formal treaty organization in her study, the Chemical Weapons Convention, is also credited with being effective in leading to the destruction of existing chemical weapons. The argument is not that networks are more or less effective in the abstract than ITOs. Rather Eilstrup-Sangiovanni argues that networks and ITOs have different merits, and in some cases, like the case of chemical weapons, TGNs can provide a practical and conceptual foundation for later treaty-based cooperation. For Stein, effectiveness is one of two central dimensions of accountability. She directs our attention to how criteria involving outcomes are consequentialist, as opposed to the rights-based criteria previously used in many advocacy and service organizations. The ability of organizations to deliver services on the ground is an essential measure of both effectiveness and accountability.

Explaining Effectiveness

But even when we can establish to our satisfaction that some networks were indeed effective, we still need to be able to try to find explanations for effectiveness. Because the definition of what constitutes effectiveness varies in different networks, it is hard to specify what features contribute to the effectiveness of diverse networks. For example, Kahler points out that in clandestine networks, the maintenance of secrecy is essential for effective action. Thus, the need for "concealment of illicit activities" may mean that "sparse and decentralized networks are more effective" at evading law enforcement. But planning complex tasks, such as the destruction of the World Trade Center, requires centralization. Thus even within a single network, there is no single recipe for success. Kahler points out that a central tension within terrorist networks is that they are simultaneously criminal networks (in that they carry out illegal activities and thus require secrecy) and advocacy networks, and thus require publicity for their political success.

Despite these difficulties, the chapters in this book propose or suggest some possible explanations for effectiveness. For example, it is possible that the *nature or structure of the networks themselves* contribute to effectiveness. One question is to what degree the various ways networks are structured will help us explain the effectiveness of political networks. In particular, do the various network structures discussed in this book help explain which networks are more effective?

Not all the chapters specify the type of network structure, and as a result we can't fully evaluate the argument about the link between network structure and effectiveness. Relatively little precise research has been done about the exact structure of international political networks (in part because the research needed to establish exactly the network type of large international networks spread across the globe is hugely time consuming). We don't actually know the structural characteristics of many transnational networks.

In general, network theory predicts that dense networks are likely to be more effective than thin networks. But other network characteristics may also be relevant. For example, do the predictions about efficiency and robustness from network theory (see Lake and Wong for a summary) help us understand which networks will be more effective than others? Networks with a scale-free structure are in general highly efficient and relatively robust, but vulnerable to the failure of central nodes. The definitions of efficiency in network theory are very limited (ability to transmit information across the network quickly) and the concerns about effectiveness in this book go well beyond the movement of information to include agenda setting and collective action. Still, it is interesting to ask whether the type of structure makes the network more effective in the broader sense.

Kahler (chapter 6) argues that three features of networked organization contributed to the successful promotion of collective action in the case of

al Qaeda: its embeddedness in existing social networks; the degree to which the network is able to provide scarce resources to its members, of a material (the operation of training camps) or nonmaterial kind (legitimacy or status); and the nature of the network structure. He argues that al Qaeda's structure and its ability to evolve organizationally contributed to its effectiveness. In particular, al Qaeda was a hybrid of network and hierarchy—a network with a hierarchical node—the Central Staff of al Qaeda leadership. This gave it a high degree of flexibility, as it could produce tightly run operations conceived by the leadership, or dispersed operations where local groups took the initiative. Kenney (chapter 5) also suggests that network structures matter for effectiveness. He says that while wheel networks were more "ruthlessly efficient," the chain networks have nevertheless helped maintain Colombia's leading position in the drug industry in the face of hostile drug enforcement efforts. This suggests that different network structures have different strengths: while wheel networks were more efficient at production or export, chain networks may be better at secrecy.

Second, the *nature of the issue area* may affect network effectiveness. International relations theorists have long understood that coordination games may be easier to solve than cooperation games; to the degree that certain issue areas resemble coordination games, networks in these issues may be more effective. Other issues, with characteristics such as the need for speed or the degree of complexity, may lend themselves more to network solutions (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, chapter 10). Peter Haas (1992) argued that particular kinds of problems, with high levels of complexity and uncertainty, were areas where epistemic communities, one of the basic kinds of networks, were likely to form. It could be that these are also issues where networks are likely to be more effective.

There is also the possibility that certain issues lend themselves more to network activity because of the *intrinsic appeal of certain issues or ideas*. Kahler (chapter 6) suggests that we can't understand the power of al Qaeda without understanding the power of identity appeals. For example, Keck and Sikkink (1998) argue that transnational advocacy networks are more likely to be effective on issues involving bodily harm to vulnerable populations with short causal chains and on issues involving equality of opportunity. Yanacopulos (chapter 4) also suggests that some issues may be perceived as "easier" to organize around than other issues. Some claim that the debt cancellation is "cheap" for states and thus more politically tractable, since the main cost is borne by the international financial institution, not by states themselves.

How Is Power Exercised within Networks?

The most important contribution that some of the chapters make to network theory is to directly incorporate considerations of power into our analysis of

networks. Lake and Wong argue that network theory must be modified if it is to help us tackle the issues of power in political networks. In particular, they argue that network theory must recognize that in real social networks (1) nodes are cognizant actors able to formulate and make utility-improving choices; (2) alternative outcomes have distributional implications for nodes, favoring some over others; and (3) nodes vary in the power or influence they possess. They argue that these fairly basic political assumptions must be added to network theory in order to make it useful to political scientists.

Hafner-Burton and Montgomery (chapter 2) are also interested in using social network analysis to understand power dynamics within networks and the international system, but they argue that social network analysis already contains the necessary tools to reveal "social power" within networks. Hafner-Burton and Montgomery define the social power (or prestige) of a state in a network as the sum of a state's ties to other actors in the system. Thus, as for Lake and Wong, nodes in the network vary in the power or influence they possess. But Hafner-Burton and Montgomery use a different definition of power than many other authors in the book, one consistent with their network-as-structure approach. Social power is an attribute of the place in the network, not of an action or an outcome.

Lake and Wong and Kenney provide additional hypotheses about how certain kinds of networks, given their structures, lend themselves to different forms of exercises of power. So, for example, a scale-free network, or a wheel network, gives lots of power to central nodes, because if they exit, the whole thing falls apart. But distributional networks, small-world networks, and chain networks don't give this same power to central nodes.

Lake and Wong's argument that "power is an emergent property of networks themselves" rests on the threat of exit in hub networks. As they recognize, the threat of exit depends on the opportunity cost of exit. Different actors face different opportunity costs for exit from networks. If Lake and Wong are correct that the threat of exit in scale-free networks is a major source of power within networks, then we need to know more about which networks have what structure, and about the opportunity costs of exit in different networks. For many advocacy groups, participating in a network is not very costly and there are benefits associated with it. Exit from the network may involve costs to advocacy organizations' core values and identities. So for example, Stein shows that the humanitarian sector has the power of exit, but to exercise that power often runs contrary to the self-identity of humanitarianism. Stein gives the example of Zimbabwe, where many feel that humanitarian organizations should exit because their presence lends support to the Mugabe regime and its policies. But to exit could lead to more suffering in rural areas, and for many organizations exit is not acceptable under these conditions.

For advocacy networks, especially with a strong membership base, the decision to exit from popular campaigns or networks may be costly in terms of

alienating members. At the same time, the opportunity costs of exiting are high because few good alternatives are available to most NGOs who exit a network, and those alternatives may be costly. As Yanacopulos said about the J2K campaign, when one member organization was asked whether disaffected members of the coalition could quit, she answered that there were "powerful reasons for organizations not pulling out, namely that to do so would go down very badly with one's own supporters and do one's own image a lot of damage." Nevertheless, exit from advocacy networks does occur. In the case of the J2K campaign, NGOs from countries in the global South exited from J2K and formed an alternative network (Jubilee South). What gave the southern groups power was not the structure of the network per se. These southern groups were not at the center of a wheel and hub network. Their power didn't come from their structural position. Their power came from the nature of legitimacy in their advocacy networks. Many development, debt, and human rights advocacy networks gain legitimacy from their claim to speak on behalf of the powerless and the disenfranchised, especially in the global South. Thus, the NGO network nodes from the South have power because if they exit from the network, they undermine one of the network's main claims to legitimacy—its claim to speak on behalf of the powerless. Network exit is often less credible for advocacy groups, and what gives groups power is not necessarily their central location in the network structure, but their central location in the legitimacy claims of the network. Thus power is not always exercised in the same way in advocacy networks as in other networks. A key source of advocacy network power is the legitimacy of their claims.

Thus, power doesn't only reside in the structural position or material resources of network nodes, but it also relates to the purposes of networks. When discussing power within and outside networks, for networks where ideas (causal or principled) are a main purpose, our understanding of power must consider "epistemic power"—the power of ideas. At least, we can't unproblematically import models of power from network theory, or models of power that just focus on the first and second face of power, but we need to also look at what Barnett and Duvall (2005) have called "productive power" or the power to constitute social subjects through knowledge and discursive practices. How and why does one understanding of human rights or the "free flow of ideas" win out over another, and what does that tell us about the operation of power within networks and in society more generally?

In epistemic communities, where the purpose has to do with causal and technical knowledge, groups will have power in part because they have unique access to such causal or technical knowledge. Cowhey and Mueller clarify how the unique technical knowledge of members of the IETF community gave them power within the network. In religious networks, where the purpose has to do with the spread of doctrine, individuals most closely associated with doctrine will have power (thus the power of the clergy in fundamentalist religious networks). In groups whose main purpose is profit, the most wealthy or prof-

itable nodes will have exceptional power. Groups with money have power in all networks, of course, but they have more power in networks whose sole or main purpose is the accumulation of profit. In groups whose main goal is the spread of a principled idea, association with the legitimacy of that idea is a central source of power.

When discussing how power is exercised within networks, it should be mentioned that in Kenney's drug networks, and often in other illegal networks as well, the threat of violence or intimidation is one of the tools used to exercise power within the network, an option that is not on the menu of most legal networks. Kenney's networks are willing to use *plomo* (lead bullets) as well as *plata* (money) to persuade actors to trade favors to carry out the network's goals. Likewise, the use of violence is one of the main ways that political authorities interact with illicit networks. This may seem so obvious as to be banal, but it once again emphasizes important differences between the way that legal and illicit networks function internally and interact with their environment.

Stein is one of the few authors who addresses the possibilities of abuse of power within or by networks. In general, the whole existence of the accountability network in the humanitarian sector is a recognition of power, and an effort to have that power made accountable. But ALNAP is a response not only because powerful donors imposed their criteria on humanitarian organizations—it also served to generate internally accepted understandings of power and risk within the humanitarian sector.

Power is exercised in quite traditional ways among states in TGNs, although with somewhat greater flexibility than in international treaty organizations. The U.S. government's perceived security needs were behind the Proliferation Security Initiative network, and one of the purposes of the network was to permit it to develop nonuniversal and nonreciprocal procedures to deal with rogue states that would not be extended to the United States. One goal of the network was to avoid imposing unwanted constraints on the legitimate or illegitimate activities of the United States and its allies, an exercise of power that would have been more difficult in an international organization (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, chapter 10).

How Do Networks Contribute to Global Governance?

Networks both participate in existing intergovernmental global governance arrangements and at times provide alternative and/or complementary forms of global governance, what we call "networked" forms of governance. By global governance, we refer to the formation and functioning of rules, institutions, and practices through which international actors maintain order and achieve collective goals (Rosenau 2000). In these governance tasks, networks have been particularly involved in standard setting and in the implementa-

tion of standards, especially through monitoring. Chapters by Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Cowhey and Mueller, and Stein all explicitly discuss network contributions to global governance. Illicit networks don't provide governance, but they provoke governance responses, some networked and some more hierarchical. The ability of networks to participate in global governance or to provoke governance responses is yet another indicator of the emerging power of networks in global politics.

Most other chapters mention networked forms of governance. Cowhey and Mueller (chapter 9) ask why certain forms of network governance have emerged and how they have evolved. Their answer, informed by the delegation literature, suggests that networked forms of governance are often the result of government decisions not to form alternative governmental or intergovernmental forms of governance.

One of the main ways that networks engage in governance, according to Cowhey and Mueller, is through setting standards. The role of networks in setting standards was also highlighted by Lake and Wong, Stein, and Eilstrup-Sangiovanni. Cowhey and Mueller argue that the form of governance that emerges in an issue area may be path dependent and idiosyncratic to the nature of the issue area. If so, it may be difficult to generalize about network contributions to global governance. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (chapter 10) would appear to agree, since she argues that TGN network governance encourages "decentralized, differentiated solutions to local problems rather than the imposition of centrally directed, uniform policies." She uses the concept of "subsidiarity" to describe transgovernmental network forms of governance. This involves "the making and implementation of decisions and policies by those who are directly involved or affected." If we think about networks as sometimes engaged in global governance structures, it expands our understanding of the nature of governance and the actors involved. Networks can expand the number and type of actors involved in governance, especially by getting nonstate actors involved in governance tasks. But as Eilstrup-Sangiovanni has also shown, some network forms of governance may also function as a way to exclude actors, such as rogue states or spoilers.

Stein (chapter 8) argues persuasively that ALNAP is an "emergent governance network." This is one of the best examples in this book of how the functions of governance are carried out by the network itself—developing standards, conducting evaluation, and sharing information that leads to changed practices in the field. Governments could have pressured for more formal organizational responses to the issues of the governance of humanitarianism, within the UN, for example, but they chose not to do so. Humanitarian organizations could have resisted more strenuously these efforts to limit the autonomy of their actions. But the network nevertheless succeeded in coming up with new understandings of accountability that were useful to network members in terms of giving them tools to conduct their work on the ground. ALNAP's ability to be a learning network seems to have allowed it to

play this governance function. Stein argues that we are more likely to see networked forms of global governance when networks "allow pragmatic solutions to develop without requiring ideological concessions. These pragmatic solutions blunted sharp conflicts of interest and strengthened the capacity of the network to attract new members and to broaden the agenda."

How Do Networks Contribute to Accountability and How Can Networks Be Held Accountable?

Networks contribute to holding other actors accountable. Increasingly, though, questions are being raised about how networks themselves should be held accountable. The discussions above have highlighted the ways in which networks wield and exercise power in global politics. Systems of accountability are essentially constraints on abuses of power (Grant and Keohane 2005). The demand for accountability of networks is thus simultaneously a recognition of the increasing power of networks. Theorists have pointed out that accountability works in different and more complex ways in the international realm than in the domestic realm. It may be even more difficult to define how accountability works in a networked world than in the general world of international politics. And even if we can define what accountability of and in networks means, systems of network accountability may be particularly difficult to implement.

Information and transparency are necessary preconditions for accountability. Exactly because networks are particularly suited to situations that require rapid and reliable information, they may be particularly apt participants in processes of global accountability. The provision of information is one key way in which most networks contribute to accountability. Human rights advocacy networks, for example, have long specialized in the provision of detailed information about human rights violations by governments, information that was previously secret. This information then can be used by networks, other governments, and international organizations to try to hold these governments accountable.

We also need to ask how networks themselves can be held more accountable. Since we recognize that networks are increasingly powerful actors in international politics, it is important to understand how such actors are held accountable. Stein makes clear some of the problems with thinking about accountability in a networked transnational space. It is not always clear to whom different actors should be accountable. For Stein, accountability is directly linked to effectiveness, since she conceives of accountability along two dimensions: representativeness and effectiveness. In terms of representativeness, humanitarian organizations struggle with multiple accountabilities. Particular tension may arise between being accountable to donors and being accountable to the people humanitarian organizations aim to help.

Stein argues that network accountability in the humanitarian sector, at least, will be measured in large part by how effective the network is in meeting its goals. A major humanitarian criteria is "do no harm," which is "deeply consequentialist" if minimalist in terms of effectiveness. But Stein also asks why networks are suddenly concerned with accountability, and why they have chosen a network to help them address the question. As states retreat from direct service delivery in the area of humanitarian assistance and take on the role of donors, they have become "increasingly present as regulators interested in outcomes and accountability." So, in this case, we see that the emergence of a principal-agent relationship between states and humanitarian organizations contributed to greater demands for accountability. Although some demands for accountability also came from within humanitarian organizations, particularly in the wake of Rwanda, there has been "an allergy to accountability" within humanitarian organizations, in part because it is difficult for organizations to acknowledge they are powerful and that they are political actors. This may also be true about a wider range of nongovernmental organization and advocacy networks, motivated as they are by principled ideas. Some humanitarians interpret the demand for accountability "as an implicit allegation of failure or even worse, as a charge of immorality," and thus it strikes at the very identity of humanitarians. Despite this allergy to accountability, the humanitarian ALNAP network has been quite effective in developing better understandings and practices of accountability.

What Are the Policy Implications of This Work?

The policy implications of this work are potentially very great. For example, the issue of when to form networks is of obvious interest to states and nonstate actors. The question of effectiveness is also very important for policymakers. In the case of the dark networks, more information about the conditions under which they can be effective may be important because policymakers will want to disrupt those very characteristics of networks that make them most effective. Kahler's argument about the features of networked organization that contributed to al Qaeda's successful promotion of collective action potentially provides both a road map for future terrorist groups and for government agencies fighting terrorism to both evaluate their past actions and plan future ones. If, as Kahler argues, the training camps in Afghanistan were essential to the effectiveness of al Qaeda, then breaking up those training camps was an important step in weakening the network.

There are huge policy implications of much of the work discussed here but these are not always completely fleshed out. For example, what are the policy implications of Stein's argument that certain demands for accountability could lead to more risk-averse behavior by certain networks? If flexibility and innovation have been one of the hallmarks of networks, it could be that

greater demands for accountability in the network sector will limit its more unique organizational contributions. Kenney's research is clearly of great interest to drug enforcement agents, but scholarly research cannot often be easily distilled into clear policy directives. Reading Kenney's work, it is not clear whether states should fight networks with networks or fight networks with state hierarchies. A DEA agent might say that the move from a wheel network to a chain network was a mark of success in the war against drugs, because it reduced the supply of drugs to the marketplace.

Transnational political networks are an increasingly important feature in global politics. Scholars of international relations can no longer fully understand most current developments in the international system without taking political networks into account. These networks have not replaced the state but exist as an alternative organizational form alongside of states, international organizations, and markets. International relations scholars will continue to study the important hierarchies (states, international organizations, and international nongovernmental organizations) in international politics, but they will want to understand how political networks integrate and interact with these actors. Past studies of transnational political networks have tended to focus on a single type of network: for example, transnational advocacy networks or transgovernmental networks. Network studies from other disciplines provide useful concepts and tools, but they have tended to ignore the politics of networks, a central concern for any political scientist.

This book, in contrast, explores a wide range of networks and explicitly focuses on the political issues of power, effectiveness, accountability, and governance by and within networks. In particular, the conceptualization of two types of network analysis—networks-as-structures and networks-as-actors—is an important clarification that helps us categorize diverse forms of research. These are ideal types, of course, and most networks "embody elements of agent and structure simultaneously" (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 5). The authors in this book relate network theories to big theoretical debates in the field of international relations, especially long-standing debates in international relations about the primacy of structure or agency in global politics, and related debates about the nature and exercise of power. Scholars who focus on networks-as-structures, not surprisingly take an approach to power that sees it emanating from the structural properties of or position in the network. Such an understanding of structural power, such as Hafner-Burton and Montgomery's definition of social power or prestige, however, often remains primarily definitional. Scholars who focus on networks-as-actors, on the other hand, are more likely to focus on the specific abilities of networks to set agendas or influence the policy goals they advocate.

To further advance the study of transnational political networks, it might be useful to end this book by posing key questions for future research. An important avenue for future research in the networks-as-structures approach is

to test whether the definitional properties of network power and prestige actually translate into successful behavioral exercises of power. Does a certain position in a network permit observable exercises of power? Are certain network nodes able to affect the behavior of other actors as a result of their position in the network? For example, can states that join many trade agreements and thus have many ties to other states use this formally defined social power to get other actors to change their behavior in line with what the prestigious state wants? To answer these questions, researchers will need to seek more information about the actions of states and outcomes and not just about their position in the network.

Sometimes the differences between networks-as-structures or the networks-as-actors are not dictated by the subject matter per se, but by the methods used by the researcher. In other words, the emphasis on one side or another in the agent-structure debate may be an issue of focus and method. Certain forms of network analysis may not permit the researcher to interrogate whether or not agency is at work, or whether actions are in fact being coordinated. Network analysis may not lead the researcher to gather the qualitative information necessary to see agency or coordination. Likewise, certain forms of research on networks as actors may presume agency, in the form of coordinated action, and be inattentive to the possibility of "uncoordinated interdependence." One can always find agency if one is looking for it, but the bulk of the dynamic at work may be uncoordinated interdependence rather than a network working as an agent coordinating outcomes. Thus in future research it may be increasingly important to combine methods so that researchers study both the structural and the agentic qualities of networks. In this book, this effort to combine methods is best exemplified by Elkins's work on constitutional networks.

In this book, the authors propose a series of more specific hypotheses about the conditions under which networks emerge and proliferate, under what conditions they can be effective, and how they contribute to global governance. On all these issues, networks are seen to exercise power, but their power does not always take traditional forms nor is it exercised in standard ways. In each of these areas, more research is needed. For example, we could use more research on the question of why networks emerge in some issue areas but not in others. There is some evidence, for example, from this book that the nature of the issue area influences whether or not actors choose networks, but this evidence is far from straightforward, and further research is needed to generate more persuasive arguments. Finally, much more research needs to be conducted on the conditions under which networks can be effective, and in particular on how network structures and properties relate to network effectiveness.

Among the virtues of this book is that it is among the first by international relations scholars to study the wide range of different types of transnational political networks. Second, the book explicitly reincorporates the study of

power into network analysis. Each chapter in the book examines either the power of networks or power within networks, or both. The book also makes an important contribution to the study of international politics by conceptualizing the network phenomena more clearly: defining political networks, discussing the various approaches to networks, and describing different types of networks and the particular forms they take. Much more research remains to be done to provide satisfactory answers to the questions we pose, but we believe this book provides an essential basis for such future research.